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Issue I1

COURT REPORTS

allocate the costs among the landowners who benefit from the
drainage. Landowners argued this process was not available to them,
as a matter of law, because the statute required the costs of repair not
exceed the benefits. Landowners also asserted the costs of present-day
repairs would exceed the determination of benefits in 1909 and that
no redetermination had been calculated. While the court decided this
is true under the statute, it also noted an alternate provision under the
statute that authorizes repairs if the drainage authority determines the
repairs are necessary for the best interests of the property owners.
This section did not use a cost-versus-benefit analysis.
The court held the petition for repair of the ditch would not be
futile and that the Landowners had failed to show evidence the
Watershed District made a policy decision against redetermination, or
a final decision on whether to repair the ditch. Landowners may
petition for repair of the ditch.
Julie S. Hanson

MONTANA
Bitterroot River Prot. Ass'n v. Bitterroot Conservation Dist., 45 P.3d
24 (Mont. 2002) (holding an authorized conservation district had
jurisdiction to determine whether a body of water was a stream entitled
to the protections of the Natural Streambed and Land Preservation
Act of 1975).
The Bitterroot Conservation District ("BCD") served as the
conservation district for Ravalli County, Montana. Under the Natural
Streambed and Land Preservation Act of 1975 ("Streambed
Preservation Act"), BCD, as the authorized conservation district, was
responsible for issuing permits to anyone who planned to alter or
modify a perennial-flowing stream in Ravalli County. The Bitterroot
River Protection Association ("BRPA") was a private conservation
group and it filed for a writ of prohibition in Montana's District Court.
BRPA wanted to stop BCD's determination of whether a slough was a
"stream" as defined in the Streambed Preservation Act. The Montana
District Court originally heard the case. Upon the district court's
denial of the writ, BRPA filed for a writ of prohibition in the Supreme
Court of Montana.
In July 1995, Brian Monta requested a portage permit from BCD
for the Mitchell Slough ("slough"). Mr. Monta planned to alter or
modify the slough, and he needed a permit because BCD considered
the slough a body of water in Ravalli County. However, a question
arose as to whether the slough constituted a perennial-flowing stream
and thus subject to BCD's jurisdiction under the Streambed
Preservation Act. BCD announced it would determine the slough's
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status following a public hearing on the issue. After the public
hearing, but before BCD classified the slough, the Bitterroot River
Protection Association ("BRPA") filed its suit requesting a writ of
prohibition.
As the party requesting the writ, BRPA had the burden of
demonstrating that BCD's proceedings to determine the status of the
slough were clearly unlawful. The district court held that BRPA failed
to meet this burden, and declined to issue the writ and the BRPA
appealed to the Supreme Court of Montana.
The Streambed Preservation Act defines a stream, but it does not
explicitly give any entity the power to classify bodies of water as
streams. Since the Streambed Preservation Act applies only to streams,
such classification is necessary.
The courts generally allowed
government agencies to decide whether an agency had jurisdiction
over a particular issue. However, courts may interfere with that
decision only when three conditions are met: (1) the agency's
jurisdiction is plainly lacking; (2) there is clear evidence that requiring
a party to exhaust its administrative remedies will result in irreparable
injury; and (3) the agency's special expertise will be of no help in
determining jurisdiction.
The court found that none of these
conditions were present in this case.
BCD did not plainly lack jurisdiction. The court acknowledged
that the Streambed Preservation Act gave BCD the explicit power of
declining its protection to certain streams. If the legislature had given
any entity other than BCD the classification power, BCD could
effectively veto that entity's decision. The court found that it made
sense for the classification power to be within the BCD's jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the initial BCD classification did not result in irreparable
injury-judicial review, for example-would still be available if BRPA
did not agree with BCD's decision. Finally, the court found that BCD's
expertise would be useful in making this type of classification. The
legislature intended the Streambed Preservation Act to protect streams
with significant aquatic and riparian attributes in need of protection;
BCD's expertise made it better equipped than the court to determine
which streams possessed those attributes. Therefore, the court had no
reason to interfere with BCD's determination of its jurisdiction over
the initial classification of the slough.
BRPA also argued that if the slough did not qualify as a stream
under the Streambed Preservation Act, it would be excluded from the
constitutional guarantee of citizen access to surface waters as a ditch.
BRPA argued that this threat to citizens' constitutional rights made a
judicial classification of the slough's status more appropriate. The
court rejected this argument, holding that no dichotomy existed
between streams (as the term is used in the Streambed Preservation
Act) and ditches (in the constitutional sense).
The court denied BRPA's petition for a writ of prohibition.
James Siegesmund

